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Abstract
To understand how decisions to invest in stocks are taken, economists need to elicit
expectations relative to expected risk-return trade-oﬀ. One of the few surveys which have
included such questions is the Survey of Economic Expectations in 1999-2001. Using this
survey, Dominitz and Manski ﬁnd an important heterogeneity across respondents that can
hardly be accounted for by simple models of expectations formation. This paper claims
that much of the heterogeneity derives from pathologies aﬀecting respondents. Adapting
a principle of dual-reasoning borrowed from Kahneman, we classify respondents according
to their sensitivity to these pathologies, and ﬁnd a strong homogeneity across the less
sensitive respondents. We then sketch a model of expectation formation.
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The decision to invest in stocks requires an assessment of the risk-return trade-oﬀ. To
measure this arbitrage, ﬁnancial researchers should be interested in eliciting the expectations
on equity returns that potential investors have. Yet the prevalent practice is to use realized
returns as a proxy for expected returns. However, it has been widely argued that realized
returns are a noisy proxy of expected returns (e.g., Elton, 1999). And basic questions about
the degree of homogeneity between agents’ expectations or their types of expectations are
unanswered if we do not ask them what they expect ex-ante (Bossaerts, 2002). Various surveys
include questions about expectations on equity returns. But most of them elicit point forecasts
or yes/no predictions which tell us nothing about respondents’ perceived risk.1 To provide
an empirical basis for the study of this risk-return trade-oﬀ, one needs to elicit subjective
probability distributions. But few surveys have included such questions so far.
Two recent exceptions are Dominitz and Manski (2005, 2007): they have undertaken survey
research measuring probabilistically the beliefs that Americans hold about mutual fund returns.
In particular, Dominitz and Manski (2005)-hereafter DM- present an analysis of answers to
expectations questions on the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) that took place in three
waves over the period July 1999-March 2001. They ﬁrst pose the following scenario (hereafter
the SEE scenario):
Please think about the type of mutual fund known as a diversiﬁed stock fund. This
type of mutual fund holds stock in many diﬀerent companies engaged in a wide
variety of business activities. Suppose that tomorrow someone were to invest one
thousand dollars in such a mutual fund. Please think about how much money this
investment would be worth one year from now.
1An example of question asking for a point forecast is the following one from the Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers (MSC): “[...] What is the annual rate of return that you would expect a broadly diversiﬁed portfolio of
U.S. stocks to earn, on average, over the next three years?”. An example of question eliciting yes/no predictions
is also provided by the MSC: “Would you expect the average return over the next ten to twenty years to be






































1Then, they ask respondents to answer various questions to state their expectations if they were
to face this scenario. In particular some expectations questions take this form (hereafter the
probabilistic questions):
What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that,
one year from now, this investment would be worth over R?
Respondents face a sequence of such probabilistic questions posed for four investment thresholds.
The four thresholds are determined by the respondent’s answer to two preliminary expectations
questions according to an algorithm detailed in DM (hereafter the preliminary questions):
What do you think is the LOWEST amount that this investment of $1000 would
possibly be worth one year from now?
What do you think is the HIGHEST amount that this $1000 investment would
possibly be worth one year from now?
These preliminary questions are thought to decrease overconﬁdence on central tendencies and
anchoring problems wherein respondents’ beliefs are inﬂuenced by the questions posed (Manski,
2004). But these preliminary questions are thought to convey no particular information about
beliefs and are thus not included in the analysis by DM, who only use the sequence of prob-
abilistic questions. They assume that each respondent i has a normal subjective distribution
N( i,σ2
i) and estimate each respondent’s subjective probability distribution of one-year-ahead
return (hereafter called the ﬁtted subjective distribution). They ﬁnd an important heterogene-
ity of reported beliefs in the sense that the values of ( ,σ) of the ﬁtted subjective distributions
vary considerably across persons. Given that the respondents may diﬀer in the way they use
public information to form their expectations, DM seek to identify types of expectation forma-
tion models: people might think that stock markets follow random walks, display persistence
or are mean reversals. But even a mixture of such models of expectation formation accounts for






































1the remaining question is“why these processes vary so much across persons”, and that there is
no “parsimonious speciﬁcation of types (that)can adequately explain the diverse expectations of
the Michigan and SEE respondents.”
In view of the apparent lack of regularity in stated expectations, a skeptical economist
might conclude that subjective expectations data are not useful tools. There are indeed several
pathologies which are likely to aﬀect the quality of the data: probabilistic questions are not easy
for ordinary people, ﬁnancial literacy is rather low in the general public and framing eﬀects are
known to aﬀect survey responses. Even if preliminary questions might help respondents answer
the probabilistic questions, some of these pathologies are likely to survive.
This paper takes these critics seriously and consider that these pathologies are an important
source of heterogeneity (if not the most important). Suppose that some respondents have a hard
time answering probabilistic questions and thus rely on rules of thumb which are prone to biases.
They are likely to provide anything but noise, i.e. hardly interpretable data. However, a fraction
of the respondents may behave roughly as expected and reveal valuable information: they take
the question seriously and, after some deep calculation, provide their “true” expectation. To
evaluate if such an heterogeneity is at work, one needs to understand how respondents cope
with probabilistic questions and to classify them according to the type of reasoning used. To
do so, we adapt a principle of dual reasoning borrowed from Kahneman (2003). In a nutshell,
we revisit Manski’s approach in the light of Kahneman (and Tversky).
The challenge is to operationalize this intuition. We take advantage of the particular two-
step design of the SEE survey, with preliminary questions followed by probabilistic questions.
Our dual system of reasoning approach boils down to measuring whether respondents are co-
herent throughout these two steps. We consider the lowest and highest values elicited in the
preliminary questions as a conﬁdence interval. Under some mild assumptions, we are able to
calibrate a probability distribution based on the preliminary questions only (hereafter called






































1prediction of an answer for a probabilistic question. Hence, the distance between a predicted
value and the actual value that a respondent answers at one probabilistic question provides a
measure of coherence. This allows us to classify individuals according to their level of coherence.
We then analyze the cross sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ) of the ﬁtted subjective
distributions conditional on this measure of coherence. We ﬁrst ﬁnd that the most coherent
individuals appear to have homogenous expectations in the sense that they price risk in the
same way (i.e. we ﬁnd a robust positive linear relationship between perceived risk σi and
expected return  i). Secondly, this result contrasts with the less coherent respondents. As
anticipated by our cognitive approach, everything goes on as if these respondents essentially
produce noise and are thus responsible for much of the heterogeneity. Thirdly, we ﬁnd that the
estimated price of risk is pro-cyclical, as the estimated price of risk for the more coherent is
signiﬁcantly lower during the last wave, a period characterized by a steady drop in the stock
market. With only three waves, the time-series dimension is, however, too short to consider this
result deﬁnitive. Fourthly, we provide more speculative results on the nature of the processus
of expectation formation and sketch a model. We support the view that survey data exhibit
enough homogeneity so that richer data sets will permit an accurate description of expectation
formation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how a dual system of reasoning can
accurately describe the traditional pathologies that aﬀect survey data, and how the speciﬁc
design of the SEE permits us to build a proxy of this dual system. Section 3 describes the
cross sectional distribution of ( ,σ) conditional on our measure of coherence. The pattern that
seems to emerge, i.e. a homogenous price of risk for the more coherent, is analyzed in detail in






































12 Surveys’ pathologies and dual systems of reasoning
This section ﬁrst reviews the objections addressed to subjective survey data in economics.
We claim that these objections are associated with diﬀerent cognitive processes used by survey
respondents. Following Kahneman (2003), we argue that these cognitive processes can be
classiﬁed as belonging to one out of two distinct types. We then explain how the information
collected, resulting from the SEE particular survey format, permits us to construct a measure
of coherence which accounts for individual sensitivity to cognitive biases occurring in surveys.
2.1 The case against subjective data
Economists are often skeptical of subjective data, in particular expectations data (Manski,
2004, p.1337). Economists usually prefer to infer expectations from data on observed choices.
The roots of this skepticism are not easy to track. We have found four kinds of objections that
can be addressed to the probabilistic questions:
i. Some individuals are sensitive to framing eﬀects. Following Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), a large literature proves that minor changes in the framing of a problem lead
to important and unanticipated changes in collected answers. This is a problem because
surveys are expected to elicit “true” values, i.e. values which are independent of the
elicitation technique used.
ii. Some individuals have problems thinking in probabilistic terms. If the question forces
them to give numerical probabilities, then the question“forces them to operate in a“mode”
which requires“more mental eﬀort”and is therefore more prone to interference with biasing
tendencies”(Zimmer, 1984, p.123).
iii. Some individuals are missing some relevant knowledge. Van Rooij et al. (2007) provide
evidence that a majority of Americans has only limited knowledge of bonds and stocks, the






































1to think that respondents with low ﬁnancial literacy are likely to provide irrelevant answers
from a research point of view.
iv. Lastly, a recurrent objection is that some individuals do not take the questions seriously.
Answering questions, particularly numerical ones, represents a cognitive burden and there
is no incentive to provide such an eﬀort. Some individual may thus provide automatic
answers, without putting in the required eﬀort.
Each of these four objections has similar consequences: collected answers are generated
by some heuristics which lead to cognitive biases. If all respondents are subject to at least
one of these pathologies, there are serious reasons to doubt about the validity of subjective
probabilistic expectations. But if these pathologies aﬀect only a fraction of the respondents,
we face a problem of unobserved heterogeneity (Flachaire and Hollard (2008) provide empirical
support in the context of value elicitation). Controlling for such heterogeneity requires opening
the black box of the cognitive process used by each survey respondent. This sounds like a
diﬃcult task. The next Subsection thus explores the possibility that the myriad individual
cognitive processes can be classiﬁed into two broad types which make sense regarding the
quality of answers provided.
2.2 Dual systems of reasoning
A dual system of reasoning consists of two systems which can be used to perform a cognitive
task. Several such models exist in psychology. Roughly speaking, they are all based on a
distinction between two systems: one is usually associated with intuition and the other one
with reasoning. This Subsection builds upon a dual system of reasoning model described by
Kahneman (2003) in his Nobel lecture. In particular, the two diﬀerent systems will be labeled
System 1 and System 2. System 1 is usually associated with intuition. It is fast, automatic






































1controlled and encompasses analytical intelligence.2 System 2 requires eﬀort. Note that the term
“System” is only “a label for collections of cognitive processes that can be distinguished by their
speed, their controllability, and the contents on which they operate”(Kahneman and Frederick,
2005, p.267).
Let’s now consider the particular task proposed by the SEE survey, namely a sequence of
probabilistic questions. Both systems are able to provide answers. System 1 will provide fast
and easy answers, such as round numbers or focal values. System 2 will provide more analytical
answers which entail eﬀort. These are the kinds of answer that researchers are looking for.
In contrast, System 1 provides noisier answers, likely to be inﬂuenced by minor details in the
survey design that can hardly be controlled for.
The analysis presented in this paper rests on the idea that identiﬁed pathologies that aﬀect
surveys derive from respondents using their System 1, rather than their System 2. Let us
consider the four objections listed in Subsection 2.1 with a dual system of reasoning in mind.
(i.) Framing eﬀects are exactly occurring when System 2 monitors judgements quite lightly,
as said by Kahneman (p.1467). Thus, individuals provide automatic answers without even
realizing that they have been sensitive to some biases. (ii.) Thinking in probabilistic terms
is directly linked to System 2 which encompasses analytic intelligence. Some shortcuts can
be used, i.e. heuristics, but they most likely lead to erroneous answers. (iii.) Now consider
individuals that are missing some relevant knowledge. They are likely to be uncertain about
their answers. Thus, any numerical cue may inﬂuence them, in particular if that cue is plausible.
They might know how to handle probabilities, but lack the relevant knowledge to perform any
computation. (iv.) Those who do not care enough about the survey or refuse to put much eﬀort
in their answers, will use the eﬀortless system, i.e. System 1.
2A more complete description of the dual system of reasoning mentions that System 2 also has a monitoring
role. It is supposed to override System 1 when some erroneous decisions are made. Errors of intuitive judgement
occur when System 2 does not monitor judgement. Indeed, Kahneman (p.1467) highlights that “the prevalence







































1Thus, even if these four pathologies are diﬀerent, they have a common consequence: they
promote the use of cognitive processes that belong to System 1. We are thus facing an het-
erogenous population, composed of “System 1” and “System 2” respondents. This has a direct
consequence: if we are able to separate “System 1” and“System 2”respondents, we can isolate
corrupted answers from high quality data.
2.3 Building a proxy of the dual system approach
As already mentioned, the survey analyzed in this paper uses a particular design. The two
preliminary questions just ask for the lowest and highest possible future values of the investment.
These preliminary questions are rather easy and do not imply any probabilistic answers. They
contrast with the sequence of probabilistic questions, which asks each respondent to provide
a sequence of points on his subjective decumulative distribution function. Providing coherent
answers between the preliminary questions and the sequence of probabilistic questions is not
easy. Respondents are likely to be prone to the pathologies described previously. Our claim is
that only those who use System 2 to answer these questions will provide coherent answers, i.e.
they use the same underlying probability distribution to answer both types of question. Hence,
we will use a measure of coherence as a proxy for the system of reasoning used.
The preliminary questions permit us to calibrate a probability distribution which will serve
to predict the answer to a probabilistic question. The distance between a predicted and an
actual answer will provide a proxy for the system of reasoning.
The preliminary questions and the calibrated probability distribution. The two
preliminary questions permit to calibrate a probability distribution under some mild assump-
tions. The elicited lowest and highest possible future values of the investment, denoted Ri,min
and Ri,max, are not interpreted literally as minimum and maximum values. Following Dominitz
and Manski (1997), the phrases“lowest possible”and“highest possible”are too vague to justify






































1dent i’s subjective distribution of e Ri, the one-year-ahead investment value based on these two
preliminary questions. To construct a measure of coherence, we ﬁrst make the two follow-








e Ri > Ri,max
￿
= α.
Assumption 1 says that the probability that e Ri lies within the interval [Ri,min,Ri,max] is (1−2α),
and the remaining part of the distribution, 2α, is equally aﬀected on the left and on the right
of the distribution.
Assumption 2 e Ri ∼ N(e  i,e σ2
i): the calibrated probability distribution is a normal distribution
with mean e  i and variance e σ2
i.
Three observations are in order concerning Assumptions 1-2. First, Assumption 1 says that
the interval is the same for all the respondents, or, in other words, α is not individual-speciﬁc.
Second, Assumption 2 imposes that e Ri is normally distributed. This is a standard assumption
in ﬁnance and it is used by DM too. Third, it is reasonable to think that α should be small.
But the notion of“small”is admittedly arbitrary. In what follows, we will perform the empirical
analysis assuming that α = 0.01, and will present a set of robustness checks with alternative
values in Section 5.
A normal distribution is symmetric around its mean, so under Assumptions 1-2, the mean
of the calibrated normal distribution is e  i =
Ri,min+Ri,max
2 . Concerning the standard deviation,
Assumption 1 says that Prob
￿
e Ri < Ri,min
￿
= 0.01. Let Φ(.) be the notation for the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. Then, the standard deviation is equal to e σi =
Ri,min−e  i
Φ−1(0.01)
Thus, e Ri follows the calibrated normal distribution:















































1This calibrated probability distribution provides a predicted answer to a probabilistic expec-
tation question. Note that if Ri,min = Ri,max, e Ri follows a degenerate distribution with all its
mass at the single point Ri,min; hence e  i = Ri,min and e σi = 0, ∀α.
The probabilistic questions. The sequence of probabilistic questions elicits the per-
centage chance that the one-year ahead investment value will be worth over four thresholds.
Hence, for each respondent i, we observe Qi,k = Prob(Ri > Ri,k), k = 1,2,3,4, where Ri de-
notes one-year-ahead investment value, and Ri,1 < Ri,2 < Ri,3 < Ri,4 are the four investment
value thresholds about which the respondent is queried. The probabilistic expectations data
are used to ﬁnd the value of ( i,σi) of each ﬁtted subjective distribution. More precisely, let
F(Ri,k; i,σi) denote the cumulative normal distribution function with mean  i and standard
deviation σi evaluated at point Ri,k. For each respondent i, we ﬁnd ( i,σi) that solves the





[(1 − Qi,k) − F(Ri,k; i,σi)]
2 (2)
We thus proceed as in DM to ﬁnd the values of ( ,σ).3 Remember that this article analyzes
the cross-sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ) conditional on a measure of coherence.
The value of a calibrated probability distribution (e  i,e σi) only serves to compute this measure
of coherence for the respondent i, as described below.
The measure of coherence. We now have two measures of one-year-ahead investment
value: Ri and e Ri. Ri derives from the sequence of probabilistic questions, while e Ri derives
from the two preliminary questions. Given that we know the parameters (e  i,e σi) of the cali-
brated probability distribution of e Ri, we can compute Prob
￿
e Ri > Ri,k
￿
. This is a prediction
of Qi,k. These two probabilities are more likely to be diﬀerent when the respondent i does not
use System 2. We thus classify individuals according to the absolute value distance between









































e Ri > Ri,k
￿
and Qi,k.













i ∈ [0,1].4 The smaller this distance, the more coherent is the respondent. The
superscript “98” indicates that the parameters of the calibrated probability distribution have
been computed assuming that α = 0.01 (implying that Prob
￿
e Ri ∈ [Ri,min,Ri,max]
￿
= 0.98).
Again, some robustness checks will perform the same analysis with various values of α.
Instead of considering d98
i , one might have compared ( i,σi) with (e  i,e σi) to construct a
measure of coherence. But note that d98
i requires fewer assumptions. It does not require any
estimation of the parameters of the distribution based on the four probabilistic questions, so it
does not depend on the assumption of normality to ﬁnd the value of ( i,σi). It does depend
only on the assumptions made regarding the calibrated probability distribution. One might
also note that the distance d98
i is a criterion of coherence based on the ﬁrst threshold value Ri,1.
We could have computed a distance at the second, the third or the fourth threshold. We shall
present a set of robustness checks in Section 5, but this will not aﬀect our main results.
3 Application
If our approach has some empirical validity, the following features should be observed : (i.)
the most coherent individuals should exhibit some interpretable pattern in the cross-sectional
distribution of ( ,σ), while the least coherent ones should provide noisier data; (ii.) as our
measure relates to some cognitive processes, the distribution of our measure of coherence should
4The extreme case d98
i = 1 can only occur for a degenerate calibrated probability distribution, such that
Ri,min = Ri,max < Ri,1 and Qi,1 = 1. Only one respondent interviewed in the SEE is concerned (in the wave 13).
He answered Ri,min = Ri,max = 120 at the preliminary questions, implying a prediction Prob
￿
e Ri > Ri,1
￿
= 0.






































1be the same if various representative samples of the population are considered, so we will check
whether the distribution is stable across the three waves of the SEE considered; (iii.) some
individual attributes, known to be related to cognitive ability (e.g., income) should be positively
correlated with our measure of coherence, while others that can hardly be related to cognitive
ability (e.g., religion) should not correlate with our measure of coherence; (iv.) in addition, it
will permit us to check whether our measure of coherence is a proxy for some variables easier to
obtain. We do not have clear cut predictions in that matter, but the validity of our approach
is stronger if our key variable (i.e. the measure of coherence) cannot be inferred from the usual
individual attributes. Hence we have four empirical claims concerning the validity of our dual
system of reasoning approach.
To evaluate the empirical validity of these four claims, Subsection 3.1 ﬁrst describes the
sample used. We then provide a cross-sectional description of the values of ( ,σ) conditional
on our measure of coherence in Subsection 3.2. This allows us to evaluate claims (i.) and
(ii.). Subsection 3.3 deals with the possible relationship between our measure of coherence and
available individual attributes. This allows us to evaluate the empirical validity of claims (iii.)
and (iv.).
3.1 The data
The data used in this paper are drawn from three waves of the SEE where the series of
questions on equity returns were posed: wave 12 (where interviews were conducted in the period
July 1999-November 1999), wave 13 (February 2000-May 2000) and wave 14 (September 2000-
March 2001). The SEE questions on expected returns were posed to 1651 respondents in the
three waves of the survey conducted between July 1999-March 2001. Of these 1651 respondents,
1284 answered the preliminary questions eliciting the lowest and the highest possible values of
the investment in one year ahead. Of these 1284 respondents, 1125 answered the sequence






































1interviews, 120 reported the same probability values at all four of the speciﬁed thresholds; the
absence of variability in the responses makes it impossible to ﬁt a subjective distribution for
them. Of the 1005 remaining respondents, we drop ﬁve other respondents because all their four
elicited probabilities (Qi,k, k = 1,...,4) take the value 0 or 1 (these ﬁve cases correspond to
the case where the responses are (1,1,1,0)). For each of the 1000 remaining respondents, we
solve the least-squares problem expressed in Equation 2 to ﬁnd the value of ( i,σi) for each
respondent i. We had some diﬃculty in obtaining a stable and unique ﬁtted value of ( ,σ) for
21 respondents, so we exclude them. Hence, our ﬁnal sample is composed of 979 respondents,
implying an eﬀective response rate of about 60% (≃ 979/1651).
3.2 Does the measure of coherence matter?
Table 1 describes the cross-sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ). Note that, as in
DM, the data are rescaled, such that  i denotes the expected return of respondent i (e.g.,
 i = 0.03 means that the expected value of the investment level a year ahead is 1030).5 The
normality of subjective distributions allows one to completely describe each respondent by a
single dot in a (σ, ) space, as in Figure 1. Panels (a), (b) and (c) summarize the cross-sectional
distribution of the perceived risk and return of the respondents interviewed at wave 12, 13 and
14, respectively.
Figure 1 clearly shows that there is an overwhelming heterogeneity of beliefs across persons.
As already found by DM, no clear pattern emerges. Furthermore, the simple fact that more
risk should correspond to higher returns is not granted. At ﬁrst glance, one might thus think
that expectation data do not contain much relevant information. In our view, this apparent
absence of an interpretable pattern could result from the noise due to pathologies that aﬀect
survey responses. If this is the case, we expect that the introduction of our measure of coherence
5For the sake of comparison, Note (i.) at the bottom of the Table provides the cross-sectional distribution of
the values of (µ,σ) in DM (Table 5, p.31). The summary statistics are similar to theirs, so the interested reader






































1matters, given that it is a proxy for the type of cognitive reasoning used.
To evaluate the eﬀect of our cognitive variable, we rank the Nt respondents according to
the distance d98 for each wave t, beginning with the lowest d98
i value, i.e. the most coherent
respondent in wave t. For the moment, we separate the respondents into three categories of
equal size, j = 1,2,3: those with high levels of coherence (“Coherent 1”), those with low levels
of coherence (“Coherent 3”) and the intermediate (“Coherent 2”). The intermediate category
permits us to sharpen the diﬀerence between the more coherent and the less coherent; hence
it will permitus to detect potential patterns easily in the cross sectional distribution of ( ,σ).6
Table 2 summarizes the number of respondents included in each category for each wave. It also
presents the distance intervals. For instance, the 113 respondents categorized as Coherent 1
in wave 12 are individuals for whom d98 ∈ [0,0.10], so the more coherent have a measure of
coherence which is lower than the upper bound 0.10 in wave 12. Note that this upper bound
is broadly the same in wave 13 and 14 (0.09 and 0.10, respectively). The lower bounds of
the respondents categorized as Coherent 3 are also remarkably similar across waves, d98 being
higher than 0.25, 0.24 and 0.25 in waves 12, 13 and 14 to be categorized as Coherent 3. So our
proxy for the dual system of reasoning behaves as expected, this stability being consistent with
the fact that d98 is related to some cognitive abilities.7
Figure 2 presents the cross sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ) by category of
coherence. Panel (a) presents a scatter diagram for the Coherent 1 in wave 12 of the expected
return against the risk. Panel (c) considers this scatter diagram for the Coherent 3 in wave 12.8
Panel (a) suggests that the expected return is positively (and perhaps linearly) related to the
risk for the Coherent 1. On the contrary, the cross-sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ)
6Creating categories is done for the sake of simplicity, but is admittedly arbitrary. We shall present additional
results in Section 5.
7Cognitive abilities change slowly over time. So, unless the general population experienced a boom in the
education level or ﬁnancial literacy, comparable samples of the general population should be distributed in a
similar fashion according to our measure of coherence.
8Instead of a dot to describe their probability distribution, a few respondents have the parameters (µ,σ) of
their probability distribution described by a cross in the panels of Figure 2. These few respondents correspond






































1for the Coherent 3 does not exhibit such a pattern. Clearly, there is an important heterogeneity
in the beliefs of the Coherent 3, and it seems that they provide no more than noise. These two
remarks are also true for the respondents of waves 13 (Panels (d) and (f)) and 14 (Panels (g)
and (i)).
We interpret these preliminary results as supporting our dual system approach. Sections 4
and 5 will analyze more in depth the cross-sectional distribution of the values of ( ,σ) condi-
tional on our measure of coherence. But before that, the next Subsection checks if there is a
relationship between our measure of coherence and various individual attributes.
3.3 Who’s who in term of coherence?
If the variation in individual attributes accounts for a high proportion of the total variation
in our measure of coherence d98, this will indicate that our classiﬁcation of individuals is a
proxy for some variables much easier to obtain than d98. If this is not the case, it will mean
that d98 conveys new information, and accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. But we expect a
little more than that. We expect that the measure of coherence correlates with some attributes
related to cognitive abilities (e.g., education, income), given that the facility of System 2 is
positively correlated with what psychologists label “need for cognition”, i.e. a respondent’s
tendency to enjoy thinking, and exposure to statistical thinking (Kahneman, 2003, p.1467).
Table 3 proposes regressions in which the dependent variable is the measure of coherence
d98. Most of the regressors are dummies reﬂecting various respondent attributes: education,
total income of the respondent in the past 12 months before taxes, the respondent’s gender,
religion and race.9 We also include a quadratic age proﬁle. And to see if d98 varies over time,
wave dummies are also included. Note that we would have liked to know if respondents hold
assets, but the SEE does not provide such data. This is a serious shortcoming that limits the
9Remark: contrary to Dominitz and Manski (2005, Table 4), there is no category“American Indian” in our
Table. This due to the fact that the number of respondents in this category is very low (8 respondents over the
979 considered). So we have included them in the base group category “Other”, like the 15 respondents who







































The ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 describe how d98 varies with multiple personal attributes
and over time using least squares. The attributes predict little of the variation in the measure
of coherence, the R2 being between 0.03 and 0.04, depending on the speciﬁcation. In fact
the estimated coeﬃcients (constant term excluded) are jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
(at the ﬁve percent level) only when the set of dummies for the income of the respondents is
included in the speciﬁcation (Columns [1]-[2]). In Column [1], only one estimated coeﬃcient
(except constant) diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero (at the ﬁve percent level): those who earn
between $50000 and $60000 have a signiﬁcantly lower d98 than the base group, i.e. those who
earn less than $10000.11 Excluding the education dummies in Column [2] reinforces the eﬀect of
income: those who earn between $20000 and $60000 are more coherent than the base group (the
joint hypothesis that the four associated coeﬃcients are equal is not rejected (P-value=0.69)).
Note that the least squares estimates of Columns [1]-[3] might fail to account for the fact
that various respondents have d98 levels which are limit values (i.e. zero or one).12 Thus,
Columns [4]-[6] of Table 3 provide Tobit regressions. The results are broadly the same, except
that respondents with a MS/PhD are now signiﬁcantly more coherent when we do not control
for income (Column [6]).
The analysis has also been performed with alternative measures of coherence, which will
be described in Section 5. The results, presented in Tables C1-C3 of the online appendix, are
qualitatively similar: the few variables signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero are mainly related to
income and schooling. For some alternative measures of coherence, two other variables become
signiﬁcant: the gender dummy and the quadratic age proﬁle. Being older or being a man
(slightly) decreases the measure of coherence in some cases. But, again, the attributes predict
10Regressions with additional right-hand side variables were considered (but not presented to save space),
such as political views and marital status. These variables were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and did not
change the results.
11The estimated coeﬃcients and the signiﬁcance levels of the wave dummies 13 and 14 (wave 12 being the
base group) are not presented in Table 3. However they are never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the base group.
12For instance, 77 respondents have a d98 = 0 and one has a d98 = 1 in the speciﬁcation of Column [1]. The






































1little of the variation in the measures of coherence. This justiﬁes the eﬀort put into constructing
our measure of coherence.
4 Interpreting expectations of equity returns
This Section puts forward several empirical regularities of stated expectations and discusses
their implications. We ﬁrst show that the expectations of the most coherent respondents exhibit
some internal consistency that can be described as respondents sharing a common price for risk.
We also ﬁnd diﬀerent estimated prices of risk across waves for the most coherent respondents.
We then explore whether these diﬀerences can be linked to the changes in stock market during
the three waves of the SEE, and permit us to sketch a model of belief formation.
4.1 On the nature of the risk-return trade-oﬀ
The SEE scenario does not fully specify the type of investment at stake. Respondents
are asked to estimate the return of a $1000 investment in a “type of mutual fund known as a
diversiﬁed stock fund. This type of mutual fund holds stock in many diﬀerent companies engaged
in a wide variety of business activities.” Respondents might have diﬀerent portfolios in mind,
ranging from relatively safe investments to highly risky ones. There is no reason to assume that
they all think of the same mutual fund on the basis of such a scenario. Thus, on the basis of the
same scenario, some might anticipate high returns, but high risk, while others might anticipate
low returns associated with low risk. At the extreme, those who have a safe portfolio in mind,
should anticipate the market to perform as risk-free assets do. If this is the case, we should
observe great diﬀerences in expected returns and perceived risks, but the price of risk should
be similar for all respondents, at least if we focus on the most coherent ones.






































1category j interviewed at wave t, the following equation:
 i,j,t = γj,t + βj,t × σi,j,t + ǫi,j,t , i = 1,    ,Nj,t (4)
where γj,t is the constant, and βj,t the price of risk for the sample of Coherent j interviewed
at wave t. We are particularly interested in the R2, the goodness of ﬁt reﬂecting the degree of
homogeneity among respondents of the same category. To avoid the fact that some observations
can exert a great leverage on the ﬁtted lines (so inﬂuence the R2), we compute a DFITS
diagnostic and exclude the respondent i of category j interviewed at wave t if he has a cutoﬀ
value of |DFITSi,j,t| > 2
q
2
Nj,t, as suggested by Belsley et al. (1980).
Columns [1]-[3] in Table 4 present the estimates for the separate regressions ﬁtted for each
category of coherence for wave 12. Column [4] presents the results when we do not distinguish
between the categories. Observations which are ﬂagged by the DFITS cutoﬀ criterion, so
excluded in the separate regressions of Columns [1]-[3], are not included in the regression of
Column [4]. Note (iv.) at the bottom of the Table provides the results if we do not exclude
these observations. The results for the two other waves are presented in the online appendix.
The diﬀerence between the more and the less coherent is striking. The estimated price
of risk for the Coherent 1, ˆ β1,12, is 1.29 and diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero at the 1 percent
signiﬁcance level. In contrast, the estimated price of risk for the Coherent 3, ˆ β3,12, is -0.01
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The null hypothesis β1,12 = β3,12 is rejected at the 1
percent signiﬁcance level (see Note (iii.) at the bottom of Table 4).
Secondly, the coeﬃcient of determination is 72% for the Coherent 1. Such a coeﬃcient
of determination is noteworthy for a cross-section of individual data, and it indicates a high
homogeneity concerning the beliefs of the Coherent 1. It contrasts with the sample of Coherent
3, where the coeﬃcient of determination is close to zero.






































1conﬁrm these results: ˆ β1,13 = 1.18 and ˆ β1,14 = 1.02 are highly signiﬁcant. They are statistically
diﬀerent from the estimated prices of risk of the Coherent 3. Lastly there is always a high
intragroup homogeneity for the Coherent 1, the R2 being 72% for wave 13 and 51% for wave
14.
Note, however, that the R2 is clearly lower in wave 14. Furthermore, the estimated price of
risk ˆ β1,14 = 1.02 is lower. The null hypothesis β1,12 ≤ β1,14 versus β1,12 > β1,14 has been tested
and the null hypothesis has been rejected at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.13 These results raise
the question: why is the Coherent 1 category less homogeneous and has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
expectations in wave 14 than in wave 12?
Remember that wave 14 was conducted during a period of seven months (September 2000-
March 2001), while waves 12 and 13 were conducted during periods of ﬁve and four months
(July-November 1999 and February-May 2000), respectively. Furthermore, waves 12 and 13
took place when the Standard & Poor 500 (S&P 500) return was between 0.20 and 0.40 per
year14, while wave 14 took place during a notable bear market, i.e. a steady drop in the
stock market accompanied by widespread pessimism. At the beginning of September 2000
(when wave 14 began), the index was above 1500 points, but lost approximatively 20% of its
value in seven months, spiking around 1200 points at the end of March 2001 (when wave 14
ﬁnished).15 So respondents interviewed at the end of wave 14 had the opportunity to observe a
substantial decline in the stock market. This may be the reason why we ﬁnd more heterogeneity
for the Coherent 1 when we consider wave 14. And the fact that the estimated price of risk is
signiﬁcantly lower in a bear market period suggests that the expected price of risk is procyclical,
i.e. the expected price of risk decreases when the stock market returns drop.
13The null hypothesis β1,12 ≤ β1,13 versus β1,12 > β1,13 has also been tested. But we have concluded that the
estimated price of risk is not signiﬁcantly lower in wave 13.
14The S&P 500 price returns per year were 0.31, 0.26 and 0.20 in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively.
And DM (Table 1, p.26) report that the S&P 500 price return reached 0.38 the year before wave 12, i.e. from
September 1998 to August 1999.
15It is considered that this bear market ﬁnished in October 2002. The S&P 500 reached a low of 768 intraday






































14.2 Towards a model of expectations formation on ﬁnancial markets
This Subsection discusses the suggestive procyclical behavior of the estimated price of risk
for the most coherent in relation to possible models of belief formation. We say suggestive
because, with only three waves, the time-series dimension is too short to consider this result
deﬁnitive. The objective is to see if the procyclical behavior of the price of risk for the Coherent
1 permits us to discriminate between some classes of models of expectations formation.
There are various ways of modeling expectation formation.16 This section does not try to
review all of them. At best, we try to discriminate among three classes of simple models,
borrowed from DM. These three classes of models have normal subjective distributions and use
the changes in the S&P 500 index to form the mean and variance of their subjective distributions.
(i.) The ﬁrst class of models is a random-walk class which postulates that the changes in the
stock market are best predicted by a normal distribution with mean and variance equal to their
long term value. (ii.) The second class of models is persistence, i.e. the recent stock market
performance is a good predictor of future market performance. (iii.) The last class of models
considers that the stock market is mean-reversal, i.e. high recent returns implies a return to
the long-term mean in the near future.
Each class of models implies some restriction on the mean and the variance of expected
returns. The results obtained for the Coherent 1 allow us to rule out the the random walk and
mean reversal classes of models. The peculiarity of random walk models is to produce the same
predictions at each point of time. If such a class of models is at work, we should observe a
constant price for risk. We learned from the previous regression that respondents categorized
as Coherent 1 do change their expectations across waves. This rules out the possibility of using
a class of simple random walk models. Mean reversal models predict that very high returns,
like those observed when wave 12 took place, should lead to lower returns in the near future.
If this was the case, the probability of lower returns should have increased in wave 13, after






































1an additional year of historically high returns. However, the estimated price of risk in wave
13 is not signiﬁcantly lower than in wave 12. In contrast, the persistence model seems to do a
decent job at organizing the data. The fact that the estimated price of risk decreases when the
stock market return drops in wave 14 means that respondents consider that recent stock market
performance will persist. We would like to be more precise on what “recent” means. But when
deﬁning a persistence model, a respondent might use, e.g., the last year’s performance on the
S&P 500 or only the last three months to form ( i,σi). So the best that we can say is that it
is probably more than the ultimate last months, given that the estimated price of risk in wave
14 is lower but does not collapse either. Nevertheless, it remains a fuzzy calibration.
One of the major ﬁndings of this paper is that there is only limited heterogeneity among the
most coherent individuals, i.e. those who are assumed to be relatively immune to pathologies
which can aﬀect survey responses. Everything goes on as if these respondents have the same
price of risk in mind and use public information in the same way. The diﬀerences seem to be
limited to the nature of the portfolio they have in mind.
The case of the least coherent individuals, classiﬁed as Coherent 3, is diﬀerent and deserves
a comment. As anticipated by our cognitive approach, we can hardly make sense of their
answers because we mainly observe noise. There are at least two ways of interpreting the
apparent lack of structure. (i.) These respondents may have expectations but are unable to
answer numerical probabilities (because their expectations are internally represented in another
mode, e.g., a verbal mode as in Zimmer (1984)). Alternatively, (ii.) these respondents may
have expectations which do not have all the structure of probability distributions, e.g., they
think in terms of upper and lower probabilities as in Walley (1991).17 On the basis of available
information, we are, however, not able to assess the relative value of (i.) and (ii.).
17Manski (2004, p.1369-1370) proposes some formats for questions to enable respondents to express a possible







































We made two important arbitrary assumptions to obtain the results of Table 4: (i.) the
linear relation between risk and return in this table is based on an ad-hoc split into three
categories of coherence (see Subsection 3.2); (ii.) the criterion of coherence d98 is based on
the assumption that Rmin and Rmax provide a 98% conﬁdence interval. This Section discusses
issues (i.) and (ii.) with the robustness of our method of identifying coherent individuals.
5.1 An alternative to the split into three categories of coherence
As an alternative to the split into three categories, we have considered the 50 respondents
who are the most coherent, and then added individuals one by one in a decreasing order of
coherence. This results in a series of growing samples of observations: the ﬁrst sample includes
the 50 most coherent, the second the 51 most coherent and so on. Then a least squares regression
on each of these samples is run. It permits us to check if the size of the category of the most
coherent drives the existence of a linear relation between risk and return. Figure 3 represents
the evolution of the coeﬃcient of determination and estimated price of risk according to these
samples, considering various criteria of coherence for wave 12.
Graphs (a) and (b) depict the results when the individuals have been preliminary ranked
according to the criterion of coherence d98. The ordinate of a dot in Graphs (a) and (b) provides
respectively the R2 and the estimated price of risk of one regression; the abscissae provide the
number of observations in the sample considered. The R2 with the sample of the 50 most
coherent respondents is 66 percent; the estimated price of risk is 1.248. (The 50 most coherent
respondents have a d98 ≤ 0.01.) The R2 reaches 79 percent and the estimated price of risk
1.36 when the sample is composed of the 87 most coherent respondents (i.e. those with a
d98 ≤ 0.052). By adding less coherent respondents one by one, the R2 decreases progressively in






































1is composed of the 200 most coherent respondents (i.e. those with a d98 ≤ 0.2); afterwards, the
R2 and the estimated price of risk decrease sharply, reaching respectively 0.04 and 0.18 when
the sample is composed of the 317 respondents considered in wave 12.18
5.2 Alternative proxies for the level of coherence
The criterion of coherence d98 is based on the assumption that Rmin and Rmax provide a
98% conﬁdence interval. One might argue that changing the conﬁdence interval can change our
results, as well as the ranking of respondents.
As a consequence, we considered 90 and 80% conﬁdence intervals to compute e Ri, and then
computed d90
i and d80
i , as we did for d98
i in Subsection 2.3. Then we carried out the same exercise
as we did in Subsection 5.1. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3 provide the R2 and the estimated
prices of risk when the criterion is d90. Panels (e) and (f) provide the results when the criterion
is d80. The results are broadly the same. In fact, the rankings of respondents based on d98, d90
and d80 are very similar, as the Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients in Table 5 suggest: the
Spearman’s rhos are above 90 percent.
One might also note that the distances d98, d90 and d80 are criteria of coherence based on
the ﬁrst threshold value Ri,1 (see Equation 3). We could have computed a distance at the
second, the third or the fourth threshold. An even more restrictive measure of coherence is a
Kolmogorov distance, i.e. the highest distance among the four distances which can be computed.






￿ ￿Qi,k − Prob
￿
e Ri > Ri,k
￿￿
￿ ￿
The computation of the four probabilities Prob
￿
e Ri > Ri,k
￿
, k = 1,...,4, necessitates ﬁxing the
conﬁdence interval deﬁned by Ri,min and Ri,max, as for the previous measures of coherence. We
18Observations which are outliers when the regression is estimated separately for the three categories of
Coherent in Table 4 are excluded. This is because these observations can exert a leverage, so they can produce






































1have considered a 98% percent conﬁdence interval. Panels (g) and (h) of Figure 3 provide the
R2 and the estimated prices of risk when the Kolmogorov distance is considered. Again, the R2
and the estimated price of risk decrease as less and less coherent individuals are incorporated.
The Spearman’s coeﬃcients with the other measures of coherence are lower, being between 30
and 35 percent. Nevertheless, they are highly statistically signiﬁcant, as Table 5 shows.19
6 Conclusion
Being cognizant of the pathologies which aﬀect answers in surveys, this paper has used
the speciﬁc design of the SEE to construct a measure of coherence based on a principle of
dual reasoning ` a la Kahneman. Our main contribution is to show that the more coherent
respondents, i.e. the least sensitive to pathologies that aﬀect surveys, have expectations which
are much more homogenous than previously thought. The price of risk for them seems also to
be procyclical, given that it is lower when the survey took place during a period of widespread
pessimism. This result suggests that the expectations of coherent respondents can be accurately
described by a simple persistence model, as we have deﬁned it.
This last ﬁnding is, however, only suggestive. Progress in understanding how people form
expectations of equity returns will require richer longitudinal data. In addition, it will be
important to investigate how expectations of equity returns aﬀect people’s behavior regarding
asset holdings. But the SEE does not ask respondents if they hold stocks. Lastly, it would
be interesting to know if our measure of coherence correlates to some measures of cognitive
capacities. We have particularly in mind questions which measure the ability to perform basic
numerical operations, such as those asked in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe. Using this survey, Christelis et al. (forthcoming) show that this ability is strongly
associated with the propensity to invest in stocks.
19Somewhat related is that dKol is more related to the set of education dummies than the other measures of
coherence, and less to the set of income dummies (see Subsection 3.3 and the online appendix). Furthermore,
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1Table 1: Fitted subjective distributions of mutual
fund returns
Quantile
Mean Std. Dev. 0.25 0.50 0.75
Wave 12 N=340
  0.32 0.60 0.03 0.17 0.50
σ 0.57 0.74 0.18 0.34 0.67
Wave 13 N=264
  0.40 0.63 0.08 0.28 0.60
σ 0.67 0.87 0.22 0.43 0.76
Wave 14 N=375
  0.36 0.69 0.03 0.20 0.47
σ 0.65 0.81 0.19 0.39 0.79
Total N=979
  0.35 0.64 0.04 0.20 0.50
σ 0.63 0.80 0.19 0.39 0.74
Note: i. For the sake of comparison, DM (Table 5, p.31) use a sample
of 986 respondents. The (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)-quantiles of   in their sample
are (0.04, 0.20, 0.50), so identical to the (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)-quantiles of  
in our sample. The same occurs for their (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)-quantiles of
σ, which are (0.19, 0.39, 0.74) in their sample as well as in our restricted
sample. Lastly, remark that the means/standard deviations of   and σ
are 0.36/0.65 and 0.63/0.80 in their sample, respectively. These values






















































































































































1Table 2: Number of persons by type of coherence and
wave
Wave 12 Wave 13 Wave 14 Total
Coherent 1 113 88 125 326
[0,0.10] [0,0.09] [0,0.10]
Coherent 2 114 88 125 327
[0.10, 0.25] [0.09, 0.24] [0.10,0.25]
Coherent 3 113 88 125 326
[0.25,0.95] [0.24,1] [0.25,0.9]
Total 340 264 375 979
Notes: i. The top entries are the number of respondents included in the
considered category.
ii. The bottom entries are distance intervals. For instance, the 113 re-



























































0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (102 obs) Outliers (11 obs)
Wave 12






















0 1 2 3
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (108 obs) Outliers (6 obs)
Wave 12





















0 2 4 6 8
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (107 obs) Outliers (6 obs)
Wave 12






















0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (80 obs) Outliers (8 obs)
Wave 13






















0 2 4 6
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (81 obs) Outliers (7 obs)
Wave 13

























0 2 4 6 8
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (80 obs) Outliers (8 obs)
Wave 13






















0 2 4 6
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (117 obs) Outliers (8 obs)
Wave 14






















0 1 2 3 4
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (118 obs) Outliers (7 obs)
Wave 14





















0 2 4 6
Risk −standard deviation−
Observations used for the regressions (114 obs) Outliers (11 obs)
Wave 14
Individuals with the lowest level of coherence −Coherent 3−
(g) (h) (i)






































1Table 3: Who’s who in term of coherence (d98)
OLS Tobit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
d98 d98 d98 d98 d98 d98
Education
≤Grade 11 Base group Base group
High school graduate -0.006 -0.011 -0.000 -0.005
(0.056) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046)
Attended college -0.039 -0.047 -0.041 -0.050
(0.051) (0.051) (0.041) (0.041)
Associated degree -0.049 -0.059 -0.051 -0.061
(0.055) (0.055) (0.047) (0.047)
BA/BS -0.058 -0.067 -0.057 -0.065
(0.052) (0.051) (0.041) (0.041)
MS or PhD -0.075 -0.085 -0.070 -0.080*
(0.053) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044)
Professional -0.029 -0.028 -0.025 -0.024
(0.071) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058)
Income
Income<10000 Base group Base group
10000≤Income<20000 -0.003 -0.027 -0.011 -0.036
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
20000≤Income<30000 -0.035 -0.056* -0.041 -0.062**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
30000≤Income<40000 -0.038 -0.063** -0.051 -0.076**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
40000≤Income<50000 -0.023 -0.057* -0.029 -0.064**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
50000≤Income<60000 -0.061** -0.084*** -0.069* -0.091**
(0.029) (0.031) (0.037) (0.036)
Income≥60000 0.008 -0.02 0.008 -0.026
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Did not know/refused -0.032 -0.062** -0.035 -0.065**
(0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030)
Age
Age/10 -0.399 -0.549** -0.414 -0.436* -0.588** -0.448*
(0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
(Age/10)2 0.004 0.006** 0.004 0.004* 0.006** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Gender
1 if male -0.017 -0.012 -0.019 -0.015 -0.009 -0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Race
White -0.014 -0.020 -0.0092 -0.011 -0.018 -0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Black 0.015 0.036 0.014 0.017 0.039 0.016
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Asian 0.030 0.015 0.040 0.035 0.021 0.047
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Other Base group Base group
Religion
No religion 0.010 0.018 0.012 0.012 0.020 0.014
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Roman Catholic 0.023 0.035 0.021 0.023 0.035 0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Protestant -0.0026 0.009 -0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.009
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Christian -0.009 -0.000 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Other Base group Base group
Constant 0.368*** 0.377*** 0.357*** 0.374*** 0.384*** 0.357***
(0.073) (0.062) (0.073) (0.071) (0.063) (0.069)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 960 907 907 960 907
R2 0.04 0.03 0.03
Signiﬁcance of the regression: P-value 0.03** 0.02** 0.13 0.10* 0.03** 0.22
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. “Signiﬁcance of the regression” provides the P-value of the joint test of the hypotheses that all the coeﬃcients
except the constant term are zero. For least squares estimates it corresponds to the P-value associated to the F
ratio for testing the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are all zero (except the constant term). For Tobit estimates the







































1Table 4: Homogeneity and estimated price of risk by type of coher-
ence -wave 12-
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Coherent 1 Coherent 2 Coherent 3 All types
       
Constant 0.06* 0.01 -0.06* 0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
σ 1.29*** 0.79*** -0.01 0.18*
(0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10)
R2 0.72 0.79 0.00 0.04
Observations 102 108 107 317
(Observations excluded) 11 6 6 23
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. To test whether the price of risk of the group “Coherent 1” is the same as for the group
“Coherent 3”, i.e. H0 : β1,12 = β3,12, we have pooled the data to convert the 3 equations
presented in Columns [1]-[3] into the following equation:
 12 = X1×(γ1,12 +β1,12 ×σ1,12)+X2×(γ2,12 +β2,12 ×σ2,12)+X3×(γ3,12 +β3,12 ×σ3,12)
where  12 is the set of 317 (=102+108+107) outcomes at wave t = 12, and X1 = 1 when
the respondents are Coherent 1 and 0 otherwise, X2 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent
2 and 0 otherwise, X3 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent 3 and 0 otherwise. We have
obtained of course the same estimates as in Columns [1], [2] and [3] for the couples of pa-
rameters (γ1,12,β1,12), (γ2,12,β2,12) and (γ3,12,β3,12), respectively. Under the assumption
that H0 : β1,12 = β3,12 is valid, we then have computed the test statistic that follows a t
distribution with 311 degrees of freedom (N = 317 and there are 6 parameters). We have
obtained a t ratio of 12.08. For 99 percent signiﬁcance levels, the standard normal critical
value of 2.58 is appropriate when the degrees of freedom are this large. So we have rejected
H0.
iv. If we do not exclude the observations that are ﬂagged by the DFITS cutoﬀ criterion, we
obtain:
  = 0.07 + 1.41∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 1 (R2 = 0.77 and N = 113)
  = −0.00 + 0.79∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 2 (R2 = 0.68 and N = 114)
  = −0.08∗ + 0.06σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 3 (R2 = 0.03 and N = 113)
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Figure 3: Robustness checks: Evolution of the coeﬃcient of determination and the estimated price of risk adding respondents







































1Table 5: Spearman’s rank correlation co-
eﬃcients between the diﬀerent measures of
coherence -wave 12-
d98 d90 d80 dKol
d98 1 0.97*** 0.91*** 0.30***
d90 1 0.96*** 0.34***
d80 1 0.35***
dKol 1
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance,
respectively.
A Appendix: Results for the wave 13
Table A1: Homogeneity and estimated price of risk by type of
coherence -wave 13-
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Coherent 1 Coherent 2 Coherent 3 All types
       
Constant 0.07** 0.034 0.05 0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
σ 1.18*** 0.76*** 0.05 0.35***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
R2 0.72 0.70 0.00 0.15
Observations 80 81 80 241
(Observations excluded) 8 7 8 23
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. To test whether the price of risk of the group “Coherent 1” is the same as for the group
“Coherent 3”, i.e. H0 : β1,13 = β3,13, we have pooled the data to convert the 3 equations
presented in Columns [1]-[3] into the following equation:
 13 = X1×(γ1,13 +β1,13 ×σ1,13)+X2×(γ2,13 +β2,13 ×σ2,13)+X3×(γ3,13 +β3,13 ×σ3,13)
where  13 is the set of 241 (=80+81+80) outcomes at wave t = 13, and X1 = 1 when the
respondents are Coherent 1 and 0 otherwise, X2 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent 2
and 0 otherwise, X3 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent 3 and 0 otherwise. We have
obtained of course the same estimates as in Columns [1], [2] and [3] for the couples of pa-
rameters (γ1,13,β1,13), (γ2,13,β2,13) and (γ3,13,β3,13), respectively. Under the assumption
that H0 : β1,13 = β3,13 is valid, we then have computed the test statistic that follows a t
distribution with 235 degrees of freedom (N = 241 and there are 6 parameters). We have
obtained a t ratio of 11.49. For 99 percent signiﬁcance levels, the standard normal critical
value of 2.58 is appropriate when the degrees of freedom are this large. So we have rejected
H0.
iv. If we do not exclude the observations that are ﬂagged by the DFITS cutoﬀ criterion, we
obtain:
  = 0.15∗ + 1.15∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 1 (R2 = 0.60 and N = 88)
  = 0.02 + 0.71∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 2 (R2 = 0.61 and N = 88)
  = 0.02 + 0.06σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 3 (R2 = 0.03 and N = 88)
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Figure A1: Robustness checks: Evolution of the coeﬃcient of determination and the estimated price of risk adding respondents







































1Table A2: Spearman’s rank correlation co-
eﬃcients between the diﬀerent measures of
coherence -wave 13-
d98 d90 d80 dKol
d98 1 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.28***
d90 1 0.94*** 0.32***
d80 1 0.35***
dKol 1
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance,
respectively.






































1Table B1: Homogeneity and estimated price of risk by type of
coherence -wave 14-
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Coherent 1 Coherent 2 Coherent 3 All types
       
Constant 0.09** 0.02 -0.08** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
σ 1.02*** 0.70*** 0.15*** 0.26***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.51 0.64 0.13 0.10
Observations 117 118 114 349
(Observations excluded) 8 7 11 26
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. To test whether the price of risk of the group “Coherent 1” is the same as for the group
“Coherent 3”, i.e. H0 : β1,14 = β3,14, we have pooled the data to convert the 3 equations
presented in Columns [1]-[3] into the following equation:
 14 = X1×(γ1,14 +β1,14 ×σ1,14)+X2×(γ2,14 +β2,14 ×σ2,14)+X3×(γ3,14 +β3,14 ×σ3,14)
where  14 is the set of 349 (=117+118+114) outcomes at wave t = 14, and X1 = 1 when
the respondents are Coherent 1 and 0 otherwise, X2 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent
2 and 0 otherwise, X3 = 1 when the respondents are Coherent 3 and 0 otherwise. We have
obtained of course the same estimates as in Columns [1], [2] and [3] for the couples of pa-
rameters (γ1,14,β1,14), (γ2,14,β2,14) and (γ3,14,β3,14), respectively. Under the assumption
that H0 : β1,14 = β3,14 is valid, we then have computed the test statistic that follows a t
distribution with 343 degrees of freedom (N = 349 and there are 6 parameters). We have
obtained a t ratio of 7.15. For 99 percent signiﬁcance levels, the standard normal critical
value of 2.58 is appropriate when the degrees of freedom are this large. So we have rejected
H0.
iv. If we do not exclude the observations that are ﬂagged by the DFITS cutoﬀ criterion, we
obtain:
  = 0.17∗∗∗ + 0.78∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 1 (R2 = 0.66 and N = 125)
  = −0.09 + 0.92∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 2 (R2 = 0.76 and N = 125)
  = −0.13∗∗∗ + 0.20∗∗∗σ + ˆ ǫ for Coherent 3 (R2 = 0.21 and N = 125)
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Figure B1: Robustness checks: Evolution of the coeﬃcient of determination and the estimated price of risk adding respondents







































1Table B2: Spearman’s rank correlation co-
eﬃcients between the diﬀerent measures of
coherence -wave 14-
d98 d90 d80 dKol
d98 1 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.30***
d90 1 0.96*** 0.32***
d80 1 0.33***
dKol 1
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance,
respectively.
C Appendix: Who’s who in term of coherence consider-






































1Table C1: Who’s who in term of coherence (d90)
OLS Tobit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
d90 d90 d90 d90 d90 d90
Education
≤Grade 11 Base group Base group
High school graduate -0.009 -0.013 0.000 -0.004
(0.054) (0.054) (0.043) (0.043)
Attended college -0.042 -0.052 -0.036 -0.046
(0.049) (0.048) (0.038) (0.038)
Associated degree -0.051 -0.061 -0.046 -0.056
(0.053) (0.052) (0.043) (0.043)
BA/BS -0.056 -0.066 -0.051 -0.060
(0.050) (0.049) (0.038) (0.038)
MS or PhD -0.082 -0.093* -0.077* -0.088**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.041) (0.040)
Professional -0.020 -0.022 -0.012 -0.013
(0.069) (0.067) (0.053) (0.053)
Income
Income<10000 Base group Base group
10000≤Income<20000 0.004 -0.019 0.002 -0.022
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
20000≤Income<30000 -0.029 -0.051* -0.033 -0.055*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
30000≤Income<40000 -0.032 -0.057* -0.036 -0.062**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
40000≤Income<50000 -0.027 -0.060** -0.026 -0.060**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
50000≤Income<60000 -0.061** -0.084*** -0.060* -0.084**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033)
Income≥60000 0.006 -0.027 0.005 -0.029
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Did not know/refused -0.036 -0.067** -0.036 -0.068**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
Age
Age/10 -0.331 -0.484* -0.363 -0.327 -0.476** -0.355
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
(Age/10)2 0.004 0.006** 0.004 0.004 0.005** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender
1 if male -0.015 -0.009 -0.018 -0.015 -0.009 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Race
White -0.015 -0.021 -0.011 -0.014 -0.020 -0.010
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Black 0.015 0.035 0.013 0.015 0.036 0.014
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Asian 0.022 0.006 0.031 0.026 0.009 0.035
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Other Base group Base group
Religion
No religion 0.012 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.021 0.017
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Roman Catholic 0.024 0.036* 0.022 0.024 0.036 0.022
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Protestant -0.003 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Christian 0.000 0.010 -0.002 -0.001 0.009 -0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Other Base group Base group
Constant 0.331*** 0.341*** 0.326*** 0.323*** 0.339*** 0.316***
(0.070) (0.059) (0.070) (0.065) (0.058) (0.063)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 960 907 907 960 907
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03
Signiﬁcance of the regression: P-value 0.02** 0.02** 0.09* 0.07* 0.03** 0.12
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. “Signiﬁcance of the regression” provides the P-value of the joint test of the hypotheses that all the coeﬃcients
except the constant term are zero. For least squares estimates it corresponds to the P-value associated to the F
ratio for testing the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are all zero (except the constant term). For Tobit estimates the







































1Table C2: Who’s who in term of coherence (d80)
OLS Tobit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
d80 d80 d80 d80 d80 d80
Education
≤Grade 11 Base group Base group
High school graduate -0.016 -0.020 -0.014 -0.018
(0.052) (0.051) (0.040) (0.041)
Attended college -0.047 -0.057 -0.044 -0.055
(0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036)
Associated degree -0.053 -0.064 -0.051 -0.062
(0.050) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
BA/BS -0.053 -0.064 -0.049 -0.060*
(0.047) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036)
MS or PhD -0.080* -0.091* -0.075* -0.087**
(0.048) (0.047) (0.039) (0.038)
Professional -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.009
(0.066) (0.064) (0.050) (0.050)
Income
Income<10000 Base group Base group
10000≤Income<20000 0.009 -0.013 0.006 -0.016
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
20000≤Income<30000 -0.027 -0.047* -0.030 -0.050*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
30000≤Income<40000 -0.024 -0.049* -0.030 -0.054**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
40000≤Income<50000 -0.031 -0.061** -0.033 -0.063**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
50000≤Income<60000 -0.059** -0.079*** -0.061* -0.081**
(0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031)
Income≥60000 0.005 -0.025 0.002 -0.028
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Did not know/refused -0.037 -0.067** -0.041 -0.071***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Age
Age/10 -0.301 -0.439* -0.341 -0.293 -0.420* -0.336
(0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
(Age/10)2 0.004 0.005** 0.004 0.004 0.005** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender
1 if male -0.010 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.004 -0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Race
White -0.013 -0.018 -0.010 -0.016 -0.021 -0.013
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Black 0.017 0.036 0.015 0.019 0.039 0.018
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Asian 0.012 -0.002 0.019 0.011 -0.002 0.019
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Other Base group Base group
Religion
No religion 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.016
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Roman Catholic 0.021 0.031 0.020 0.021 0.032 0.021
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Protestant -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.004
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Christian 0.002 0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Other Base group Base group
Constant 0.305*** 0.312*** 0.305*** 0.303*** 0.311*** 0.301***
(0.067) (0.057) (0.067) (0.062) (0.055) (0.060)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 960 907 907 960 907
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03
Signiﬁcance of the regression: P-value 0.02** 0.04** 0.16 0.08* 0.02** 0.18
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. “Signiﬁcance of the regression” provides the P-value of the joint test of the hypotheses that all the coeﬃcients
except the constant term are zero. For least squares estimates it corresponds to the P-value associated to the F
ratio for testing the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are all zero (except the constant term). For Tobit estimates the







































1Table C3: Who’s who in term of coherence (dKol)
OLS Tobit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
dKol dKol dKol dKol dKol dKol
Education
≤Grade 11 Base group Base group
High school graduate -0.068 -0.071 -0.067 -0.070
(0.057) (0.056) (0.046) (0.046)
Attended college -0.077 -0.084* -0.077* -0.085**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
Associated degree -0.131** -0.137** -0.131*** -0.137***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
BA/BS -0.124** -0.131*** -0.124*** -0.131***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
MS or PhD -0.125** -0.132** -0.125*** -0.132***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044)
Professional -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068
(0.070) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058)
Income
Income<10000 Base group Base group
10000≤Income<30000 0.014 -0.018 0.015 -0.017
(0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)
20000≤Income<30000 -0.024 -0.041 -0.025 -0.041
(0.035) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030)
30000≤Income<40000 0.012 -0.019 0.012 -0.019
(0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
40000≤Income<50000 -0.008 -0.038 -0.008 -0.038
(0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032)
50000≤Income<60000 -0.039 -0.061 -0.039 -0.061*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Income≥60000 0.012 -0.023 0.012 -0.023
(0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028)
Did not know/refused -0.024 -0.065* -0.024 -0.064**
(0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
Age
Age/10 -0.075 -0.308 -0.081 -0.074 -0.308 -0.080
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25)
(Age/10)2 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Gender
1 if male -0.035** -0.026* -0.036*** -0.035** -0.026* -0.036***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Race
White 0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.006 0.005
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Black 0.058 0.059 0.055 0.059 0.060 0.056
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Asian 0.008 -0.009 0.011 0.008 -0.009 0.010
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
Other Base group Base group
Religion
No religion -0.000 0.008 0.003 -0.000 0.008 0.004
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Roman Catholic 0.029 0.039 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.029
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Protestant 0.024 0.029 0.025 0.024 0.030 0.025
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Christian 0.037 0.051** 0.036 0.037 0.051** 0.037
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Other Base group Base group
Constant 0.539*** 0.522*** 0.543*** 0.539*** 0.522*** 0.543***
(0.079) (0.064) (0.077) (0.071) (0.062) (0.069)
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 907 960 907 907 960 907
R2 0.05 0.03 0.04
Signiﬁcance of the regression: P-value 0.01** 0.07* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00***
Notes: i. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ represent 10, 5 and 1% signiﬁcance, respectively.
ii. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
iii. “Signiﬁcance of the regression” provides the P-value of the joint test of the hypotheses that all the coeﬃcients
except the constant term are zero. For least squares estimates it corresponds to the P-value associated to the F
ratio for testing the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are all zero (except the constant term). For Tobit estimates the
P-value is the one associated to the likelihood ratio statistic which has a limiting chi-squared distribution under the
null hypothesis.
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